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Abstract:
This paper examines the recent upward trend of patent applications and its impact on
Research and Development Expenditure in the U.S. and the EU. Opening with the decline in
total factor productivity in the United States, the paper focuses on the decline by analyzing the
effect that patents have on research and development expenditure, taking firm size, government
subsidization, and historical financial performance, into account. Patents were found to have an
increasing effect on research and development expenditure decreasing rate.

I.

Introduction:

This paper’s goal is to investigate the impact, if any, that patents have on research and
development expenditure, using the United States and European Union as the samples. The time
will be from the mid-1990s to the mid-2010s. Since the late twentieth century, the United States
has been facing a decline in growth of total factor productivity. As economists, we view
productivity as a vital component to a growing economy. Any productivity lost that could have
been gained instead can be considered an opportunity cost. For firms to stay competitive, they
must be productive, for goods to stay at the equilibrium price, goods and services must be
produced at equilibrium level which requires labor and capital. That is not to say productivity is
on the decline, but that productivity is increasing but at a decreasing rate. For the future this
means we can only expect marginal gains in growth in all sectors. While this decline in growth
has occurred, the number of patents have been exponentially increasing since the 1970s,
simultaneously, R&D expenditure has oscillated around the 2.5 percent mark (Boldrin, Levine,
2013, p. 2). It should be a concern to regulators that patent litigations could create potential
opportunity costs that could put the economy at a disadvantage.
Looking at the historical purpose for patents. Patents of the past protected the innovator’s
financial interest by restricting would-be innovators from copying their design or ‘art’. A patent,
also known as intellectual property rights, is no different from a property right for a house.
However, like property rights, patents also suffer from costly litigation disputes. However, unlike
a house, patents can greatly affect innovation in an economy for better or worse. Patents found
immense popularity with the “third industrial revolution” (Gordon, 2016, p. 578) during the
1990s, also known as the internet boom. It was also at this period that the growth in total factor

productivity, a measurement for determining how efficiently inputs are utilized in production,
was at its lowest in comparison to its historical counterparts.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship, if any, between the exponential rise
of patents and the oscillating nature of R&D expenditure present in both the U.S. and EU. Data
on patent applications, patents granted, R&D expenditure, subsidization, firm size distribution,
and historical financial performance, is gathered. A double-log function will specify the
regression model since it is expected that the relationship between patents and R&D expenditure
is non-linear.
The contributions of this work are providing an econometric model to Boldrin and Levine’s
(2013) opening statement concerning patents and R&D expenditure. Whereas a linear model is
only concerned about constant slopes, a double-log model will show changing elasticities in the
slopes. This allows us to see whether, if statistically significant, patents have an increasing effect
on R&D expenditure at an increasing or decreasing rate or a decreasing effect at a decreasing
rate (Sokolov-Mladenović, Cvetanović, and Mladenović, p. 13, 2016).
Patents were found to have an increasing effect on R&D expenditure at a decreasing contrary
to the expectation that patents would simply be negative. The magnitude of the effect increased
as the firm size variable increased. The firm size variable itself was the most varied in terms of
coefficients. Although both were relatively unaffected when placed under a different patent
variable, the order of magnitude was the most surprising. Subsidization fell out of expectations
possibly to due to the ‘relabeling’ issue. Historical financial performance also fell out of
expectations possibly due to the fact that its theory is based on Booth, Junttila, Kallunki, Rahiala
and Sahlström’s (2006) linear relationship expectation between equity performance and R&D
investments.

Section II reviews the literature. Section III presents the analytical framework. Section IV
lists the data and variables used. Section V specifies the final econometric model. Section VI
shows the sample regression and discussion of results. Section VII concludes with a discussion
on policy implication, limitations of research, relation to the literature, and future research
possibilities.

II.

Literature Review:
To frame the main topic, I will be looking at the patent systems of the US and the EU and

seeing how the relationship between patents and research and development expenditure in the
US and the EU compares to one another.
The comparison of the U.S. and EU would help to better understand the relationship of
patents, R&D, innovation, and then hopefully economic growth. Despite the EU being a
representative entity of its members rather than a single country like the US, the size and
significance and exposure to economic shocks will allow me to better compare the two entities
than say using a much smaller and less relevant entity to compare to the US. In addition, the US
and EU both have well-fleshed out patent systems that aren’t hampered by the issues faced by
developing countries, this allows the two entities to be more comparable.
However, property and patents only potentially provide incentives. Bessen & Meurer
(2008) find that property rights can fail when their validity is uncertain. Using the transition from
Mexican to American rule in California during the nineteenth century, as an example, there was
a clouded validity of land titles under Spanish and Mexican Rule. This uncertainty led to
squatting and decline in agricultural productivity. Property rights can fail when rights are so
fragmented that costs of acquiring & negotiating the rights necessary to make an investment

becomes cost-prohibitive. This was the case in Russian retail establishments in the USSR’s
transition to a private economy. Ownership rights were granted to many interested parties,
making it difficult for any one party to acquire the necessary ownership rights to operate a store.
Stores were often out of business while street vendors conducted trade nearby. Property rights
can fail when boundary information is not made publicly accessible. In developing countries
people were discouraged from recording their property right boundaries, due to cumbersome
regulation, which limited their ability to trade property or use it as collateral for obtaining loans.
Finally, property rights can fail when there are no clear and predictable boundaries of the rights.
This problem is common with property extracted from nature, such as mineral extraction rights.
Minerals beneath earth twist and turn in unpredictable ways. Such an unpredictable boundary led
to a violent struggle between rival claimants in Butte, Montana.
While these examples are wide in scope in terms of time and international evidence, it
emphasizes the importance of proper implementation of property rights, including patents.
Economic effectiveness of any property systems depends not just on what it protects, but also on
the institutions, regulations, laws, and norms that implement the property systems. Subsequently,
the similarity between patent law and law of tangible property can obscure crucial differences in
economic performance indicators because these similarities are implemented differently. A
tangible property law might not work as well as patents if patent law is not implemented
effectively.

Background
As economists, we view innovation, in the form of new products and processes as public
goods. This means inventors and authors cannot prevent others from appropriating or using their
inventions without the intervention of the legal system. It was discovered that an imitator’s cost
are approximately 65 percent of the original innovator’s cost. Most of the results produced by
R&D are already in the hands of imitators within 12 to 18 months of the original invention
(Glick, Hoffman, Reyman, p.63, 2003). The goal of intellectual property law is the optimal
subtraction of total social cost of innovation subtracted from total social benefit. However, issues
in the apparent trade-off between IP laws and incentives for dynamic efficiency and incentives
for static efficiency.
For reference, dynamic efficiency refers to the increase in consumer welfare from costreducing processes and new products. Static efficiency refers to the increased benefit that
consumers obtain from lower prices and increased input (Glick, Hoffman, Reyman, p. 64, 2003).
In terms of total factor productivity, dynamic efficiency and static efficiency will influence its rate
of growth over time.
Benefits from innovation include lower factor costs overall and better products. However,
there is a twofold cost to this trade-off. The opportunity cost that innovation consumes, through
R&D expenditure, on resources that could be put to other uses, and the reduction of static
efficiency due to the exclusionary rights that IP laws grant, meaning consumers pay higher prices
and the market has less output than the equilibrium. Nordhaus (1969), one of the first economist
to address this trade-off, discovered that as the amount of cost reduction from innovation from
longer patent length increases, society waits longer for the full benefits of the innovation to
materialize. Simultaneously, growth profits earned by monopolies decrease heavily, resulting in

less incentivization to innovate. In my paper, I will not be using patent length, but rather the
generalized form of patent applications to capture the macroscopic effect of patents on R&D
expenditure.
Innovation benefits the economy and the community by creating new and improved
means of producing goods and services to satisfy social needs. For example, an innovation into a
vaccine for a deadly virus will substantially reduce child mortality in poverty stricken countries,
thereby increasing the chances of a healthier workforce. However, the United States has
experienced 1.2 percent annual growth in total factor productivity between the period of 1970 to
1979, while in the periods 1990 to 1999 and 2000 to 2009 it has been below 1 percent.
Meanwhile, US research and development expenditure has fluctuated around 2.5 percent of
GDP. Simultaneously, the number of patents issued more than quadrupled (Boldrin, Levine,
2013, p. 2). Boldrin and Levine (2013) assert that patents do not help with innovation, however
they do not establish any empirical relationship between patents and research & expenditure,
which the latter is a vital component to inventing and innovating. The empirical relationship is
what this paper sets out to do.

Relationship between Patents and Research and Development
Chaudhuri find that after the introduction of TRIPS, (Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights), the large Indian pharmaceutical companies who are
significant R&D spenders have been focusing on countries with more lucrative markets such as
the United States. In this regard, the primary incentive to invest in R&D was not due to the
TRIPS agreements but the already established product patent regimes in developed countries
which TRIPS did not apply to. TRIPS accelerated the R&D activities due to restrictions placed

by TRIPS on domestic opportunities, but in the absence of TRIPS R&D activities would still
have been undertaken. Furthermore, with larger domestic operations in the absence of TRIPS,
Indian pharmaceuticals would have had access to larger pools of technical resources. TRIPS
introduced a framework for intellectual property rights to member countries. Patenting by Indian
pharmaceuticals also rose significantly. Pharmaceutical R&D activities became diversified but
pharmaceuticals did not create new innovative products. The only noticeable change was the
ability for Indian companies to develop generics, an ability that was already acquired and
improved before TRIPS.
Despite the lack of innovative pharmaceutical products, the impact of TRIPS is unlikely
to have a negative impact on overall productivity growth. Developing countries tend to have the
largest market for new drugs (Chaudhuri, 2007, p.17) which generic companies can take
advantage of. Generic companies are legally entitled to continue developing processes for drugs
that have been innovated from abroad and supplying these at lower prices locally and to other
developing markets. In the case of antiretroviral drugs (ARVs), the price of the originator
company exceeded $10,000 per person per year, far beyond the reach of most people in
developing countries. However, when Indian generic companies acquired and developed the
processes for ARVs the prices were improved substantially due to competition among the
generic companies. Prices were reduced to less than $100 per year from India. (Chaudhuri, 2007,
p.18). The example of the economic effects the TRIPS agreement had on Indian pharmaceuticals
is one of the reasons why this paper is comparing the US to the EU. The two are highly
developed economies that follow their own well-established patent protocols. The TRIPS
agreement modified the R&D activities of Indian pharmaceuticals to focus on capturing the
generics market meaning there is potentially less incentivization to innovate new drugs.

However, the US and the EU markets is saturated with generics meaning there is still a strong
incentive to innovate.
The private sector continues to contribute the majority share of research funds. In 2009,
private R&D expenditure was twice the size of government sponsored R&D (Clancy and
Moschini, p. 3, 2013). Such a large quantity of private R&D must overcome the problems
associated with the private provision of knowledge, which could generally be a public good. One
solution to overcome the acquisition of a public good in a market setting can be seen in legally
sanctioned intellectual property rights (IPRs). IPRs can take the form of patents, copyrights,
trademarks, and trade secrets. The privatization of knowledge brought about by IPRs brings out
some unintended consequences and side effects which include social costs that run against the
supposed positive incentive effects that patents provide
Patents grant individuals or groups the right to exclude others from making, using, or
selling patented ideas and techniques. Thus, patents endow inventors with property rights to their
knowledge and ideas, thereby affecting the exclusivity of the otherwise public good. Patents are
limited in time (the period of protection) and scope (the parameters granted by the patent). For
the purposes of this paper, these factors will be encompassed by an aggregate total number of
patent applications and patents granted. This will make the effects of patents on R&D
expenditure generalized but simpler to understand.
The extent to that patents provide an incentive to innovate depends on patent length and on
the scope of its intellectual and exclusionary rights, the patent’s breadth. The patent’s breadth
directly influences the size of the original innovator’s profit flow, and the deadweight welfare loss
L. Narrow patents (i.e. patents that do not have significant breadth), which easy to imitate, may
not provide sufficient levels of providing incentives to innovators. However, broader patents may

bring upon deadweight losses due to an excessive monopoly distortion and a decrease in the rate
of technical progress, since future innovation are faced with obstacles raised by previous
innovators (Encauoua, 2003, p.2). Although it makes logical sense to include patent breadth and
depth into my patent variable, it is currently beyond the scope of this paper which is about
analyzing the macro effect of patents on R&D expenditure. Encauoua (2003) developed patent
variables based on length and breadth due to the fact it is micro focused variable. My paper aims
to find the net effect that patents have on R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP. To consider
the dozens of industry’s hundreds of thousands of patents to understand the dynamics of R&D and
patents is simply beyond my current technical ability.
Extending the point about incentives, Hunt (2006) presents a simple model that explores
the relationship between the incentive to invent, the requirement of R&D expenditure, and the
incentive to obtain patents. Treating the two incentives as separate decisions, Hunt derives that
patents and R&D to be substitute inputs in the production of firm profits. Hunt discovers firms that
typically do a lot of R&D also tend to patent more. Ordinarily, reducing the cost of R&D, or of
patenting, will stimulate additional R&D expenditure. However, there is a point at which patents
reduce R&D expenditure. Every firm is concerned with its rival's patent strategies and the rents its
rival could incur if it infringes upon the rival's patents. Compiled with the incremental reductions
in the cost of obtaining patents, the likelihood of infringement increases. This does not mean R&D
investment is eliminated, however, it is reduced so less innovation would occur. The firm could
potentially lose out on any productivity enhancing inventions (Hunt, p.1, 2006). This is crucial as
it explains firm behavior in a market filled with incomplete information about patents. Firms would
react differently if they had perfect information on their competitor’s patents. This adds to the
difficulty of creating a reliable patent variable. By using patent application data, which I have

easier access to than individual patents, I will be able to capture the aggregate effect of multiple
industries’ decision making.

Relationship between Research and Development and Innovation
With innovation, research & development, and patents all connected, this paper will be
focusing on the relationship between patents and R&D. Innovation, the byproduct of the R&D
and patents, is also a key component to economic growth. By keeping the focus on R&D, we can
isolate the possible relationship between patents and research and development.
Boldrin & Levine begin with the disconnect between patent growth and productivity
growth known as the “patent puzzle”. In recent decades as patent protection was progressively
strengthened we did not observe an innovative explosion. Per the Bureau of Labor Statistics
annual growth in total factor productivity in 1970-1979 was about 1.2 percent, while in 19901999 and 2000-2009 it was less than 1 percent. Despite increase in number of patents issued, the
U.S. economy has not exhibited any similar upward trend in technological progress nor a similar
increase in R&D expenditure. In the same period, R&D expenditure has been oscillating around
2.5% of GDP. The recent explosion in patents did not come from new industries such as
biotechnology and software.
The first half of the literature attempts to answer the question of whether patents
encourage productivity growth. The authors conducted a meta-analysis that examined whether
patent introducing or strengthening patent protection lead to greater innovation. Their studies
found little to no evidence that strengthening patent systems increased innovation. They found
countries that start off with weak intellectual property regimes have increased flow of foreign
direct investment to sectors where patents are commonly found. Countries like the U.S. and EU

are not as reliant on foreign direct investment, allowing me to isolate the effects of patent
protection on R&D expenditure.
Boldrin and Levine (2004) attempt to debunk common proponents for patent protection.
One proponent is the notion that patents are a substitute for socially costly trade secrecy and
improve communication about ideas (Boldrin and Levine 2004; Ponce 2007). While studies of
the usefulness of information disclosure in patent litigation are not widely available, according to
sworn testimony by Google’s chief of Android development during Oracle vs. Google, engineers
that developed Google’s Android were unaware of Oracle’s patents and so were not helped by
the patents (Niccolai 2012). A Microsoft developer reflects on one of its many practices to
“never search, view, or speculate about patents”. The legal jargon was indecipherable by anyone
except a seasoned patent attorney. Ignorance was the preferred method of innovation.
Boldrin and Levine comment on a separate study done by Anwar and Evanson. The
difference in this paper and mine is that I will be comparing two roughly similar large
economies. They illustrate of the issues that arise from studies on patents and innovation. Based
on data for 31 countries between the period of 1981-1990, they find support for the correlation
that higher patent protection leads to higher R&D spending as a percentage of GDP. However,
the opposite was also plausible. Countries with larger markets can easily shoulder the fixed costs
of innovation.
Anwar and Evanson compares countries with relatively small economies, very little
patent litigation, and low R&D expenditure with countries with relatively larger economies,
significantly greater patent litigation, and higher R&D expenditure. In summary, their findings
show that strengthening intellectual property protection increase R&D expenditure up until a
certain point that is the gains to R&D expenditure falls. Countries on the lower levels of GDP

have their R&D expenditure primarily influenced by foreign direct investment even though these
countries have little to no patent litigation. Countries with higher levels of GDP don’t have the
same issue, meaning R&D expenditure is not likely to be affected by foreign direct investment.
Further justifying my selection for the U.S. and EU as my samples.

Figure 1. Annualized Growth Rates of Total Factor Productivity: 1890-2014. This figure
illustrates the diminishing growth of total factor productivity from Gordon (2016)

Looking closely at the behavior of total factor productivity (TFP) growth shown by the
vertical bars in figure 1 for 1890-1920, 1920-1970, and three subperiods since 1970. The first
subperiod, 1970-94, shows only 0.59 percent TFP growth per year, less than a third of the 1.89
percent growth achieved in the 1920-1970 period. TFP growth was faster in 199-2004 than the
other two subperiods post-1970.
The contrast between the white and grey bars is an interpretation of the significant rise in
the level of TFP because of the implementation and extension of the pioneering inventions

associated with the Second Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century. The 1999-2004 TFP
annual growth reflects the contribution of the Third Industrial Revolution, associated with
computers and digitalization. Simply looking at the differences in contributions to TFP growth,
the Second and Third Industrial Revolutions were quite different. The second industrial
revolution’s TFP growth lasted for half a century, while the third industrial revolution had a
shorter-lived and a smaller magnitude in TFP growth.
The third industrial revolution saw the marriage of communication and computers. In the
short interval between 1993 and 1998, the standalone computer was linked to the real world
through the internet. The market for internet services surged. The world became more integrated
through powerful software and connectivity. Gordon notes that the effects were limited in the
sphere in of human activity in contrast to the effects of the second industrial revolution which
changed everything such as the automobile, household appliances, and medicine. About Robert
Solow’s 1987 computer paradox, “You can see the computer age everywhere but in the
productivity but in the productivity statistics”, Gordon simplifies this to the fact that we don’t
fully utilize the innovations of the third industrial revolution the same way we used the
innovations of the second industrial revolution. In other words, we don’t eat computers or wear
or drive to work in them or let them cut our hair. The functions of our homes remain the same,
the functions of our automobiles remain the same albeit with more convenience and safety
(Gordon, 2016, p. 578).
While Gordon presents a solid reason behind the suspected lack of TFP Growth in post1970s subperiods. I believe Gordon is too hasty in his conclusion that IT is not a significant
contributor to growth. Historically speaking, for every innovation, such as the steam engine and
electricity, there has been an initial lag in fully implementing technology into society. After time

passes, the dividends of an innovation turned productivity-enhancing technology are reaped
slowly, and over time the new technologies diffuse into common use. With the IT industry being
amongst the most influential innovator during the late 20th century, no other technology in
United States history has faced anything like the broad industry opposition to software patents
that arose during the 1960s to the mid-1990s (Bessen & Meurer, 2008, p.189).
Campbell-Kelly, a computer science professor, argues that software patents are no different
from other technologies, meaning the patent system will adapt to the demands of software patents
over time. However, during the 1994-2004 period, software patents were among the highest rates
of litigation and high rates of clam-construction review on appeal. While the tangible property
rights revolve around concrete technology, it can be argued that software patents revolve around
abstract technology. Referring to our patent viability laws, abstract patent claims can violate the
“rule of first possession”, thereby allowing patent holders to lay claim to a broad range of
technology that have yet to be invented. Abstract patents have unclear boundaries and can give
rise to opportunistic litigation. It can be implied that there is something crucially different about
software patents (Bessen & Meurer, 2008, p.188).
This is not to say software publishers haven’t flourished despite the growth of software
patents, in fact it is the opposite. Preliminary studies show that although there is evidence of some
of negative effects of patents within the software industry, they have not been serious or
widespread. However, the general concern is over the software patents not the software industry.
The distinction is important because almost non-software industry firms obtain the software
patents such as electronics, telecommunications, and computer industries, while the softwarepublishing industry only obtains 5 percent of all software patents granted (Bessen & Meurer, 2008,
p.190).

The incentive to innovate certainly does exist for most industries. One incentive is the
prospect of becoming a monopoly as a reward for innovation. In terms of innovation, monopolist
power over an industry can bring the many consequences we associate with monopoly power.
While the positive impact of patents is the partial equilibrium effect of increasing profits to the
innovator at the monopolistic level, the negative effect is the subtler general equilibrium of a
reduction in everyone else’s ability to compete while promoting the incentive to engage in costly
patent litigation lobbying efforts. This creates social costs and opportunity costs since potential
R&D investment efforts are wasted away in litigation. Earlier on in my research I considered
competition as an independent variable, since monopolies would use patents to secure their rents.
I would have used to Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to compare five industries that contributed to
80 percent of R&D expenditure. However, industry data was limited by its time span which
would require a massive amount of numbers to be generated to fill in the missing data. This
would have likely skewed my data, so I avoided this variable for the time being.
A successful and useful innovation will most of the time drive labor productivity growth.
Therefore, it’s important to understand the relationship between patents and R&D expenditure is
to gain insight in the potential economic costs or benefits that patents may have total factor
productivity.
Relationship between Research & Development Expenditure and Total Factor Productivity
Research and development is often said and done, but what does it exactly mean? For our
purposes, in this paper, we use the Bureau of Labor Statistic’s definition (BLS) of R&D. Two
types exist, private R&D refers to R&D funded by private firms, and public R&D refers to
researched financed or conducted by government or nonprofit institutions such as colleges,

universities, or foundations. However, for my purposes we will see both types of R&D as a
percentage of GDP.
Innovation and knowledge are examples of a public good because of its spillover effects
to other potential users since new technology is typically not confined to its discoverer. For
example, a new drug developed by a pharmaceutical for a certain disease has its inherent
benefits, but a competitor can study the previous iteration and build on that foundation of
knowledge to develop an even better drug. The pioneering firm earns returns by selling its initial
product. However, the pioneering firm’s research generates further benefits by making the
following firm’s research feasible (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012).
There is a close relationship between R&D expenditure and total factor productivity.
R&D expenditure is heavily concentrated in manufacturing, a sector of the economy that is
declining (Clark, 2016, p.2). By contrast, the services industry has very little R&D expenditure.
As of 2015, the service sector accounts for around 80 percent of US economic output,
manufacturing sits at 12 percent of the economy. More than 80 percent of all R&D lies in three
sectors of the economy, information and electronics manufacture, medical substances and
devices, and transportation equipment, produce together less than 5 percent of value added or
GDP (Clark, 2016, p. 2).
The Bureau of Economic Analysis reported approximates of how much R&D expenditure
by private firms contributes to productivity growth. Combined with the BLS estimates of
productivity spillovers, we can assess the impact of private R&D on productivity growth. There
is evidence that R&D is a strong influencer on productivity growth (BLS, 1989). Studies have
found that the returns of R&D are extremely high and that R&D is strongest and most consistent
influence on factor productivity growth. R&D provides both direct productivity benefits to

industries conducting research, such as computer or aircraft manufacturers, and indirect benefits
to industries further along the chain of production such as when financial institutions take
advantage of new computing technology (Sveikauskas, 1986, p.1). He notes that while R&D has
received much attention, it only represents a portion of the social and individual factors related to
innovation. Other factors such managerial and organizational quality, the integration of the
industrial relations systems, factors that are difficult to quantify for the purposes of this paper are
all important components for technological advancement. These qualitative factors, however,
would make a logical extension for future research.
With this established relationship between R&D expenditure and productivity in mind,
the paper will primarily focus on the potential relationship between patents and R&D
expenditure. The motivation behind such protection revolves around the idea that without
property rights on ideas, the free market might underinvest, directly undermining research &
development expenditure relative to the socially optimal level, in the costly development of new
technologies (Gilchrist, 2016, p.1).

III.

Analytical Framework:

Economic theory behind Research and Development Expenditure and Patents
Alan Greenspan, former chairman of the Federal Reserve commented that intellectual
property has received a lot more attention than in recent decades because ideas and innovation
have become important economic resources. Property rights on ideas have outgrown the demand
for property rights on land, energy, and raw materials. At present, publicly traded companies in
the U.S. have three-quarters of value placed in intangible assets, up from 40 percent from 1980.
The product of the U.S. economy has become predominately conceptual. Intellectual property
rights form parts of these conceptual assets (Bessen and Meurer, p. 112, 2008).
In its relation to R&D expenditure, patents serve as the financial reward for anyone who is
willing to incur R&D costs. Recall that the product of R&D is knowledge which is a non-rival
good, meaning that the use of knowledge by one individual does not limit the ability of others to
use it. Intuitively, it is possible to contextualize R&D expenditures in a competitive market
economy. Assuming knowledge is subject to scarcity, like all other limited resources, the market
price of knowledge is assumed to reflect the efficient allocation of resources by equating the
marginal social cost of the good with its marginal social benefit. As a non-rival good, knowledge
can be consumed at zero marginal social cost. With the marginal social cost equal to zero, we
would assume that people would consume knowledge at the efficient level where marginal benefit
is zero, the optimal level of use, thus knowledge must be distributed freely at a zero price (Parker,
p. 4, 2012).
Clearly this goes against the incentive to invest since there would be no financial reward
to reap from incurring R&D costs. Patents and copyright laws grant monopoly rights on
intellectual-property. The inventor of said knowledge would be inclined to charge a royalty for the

license to use knowledge or earn monopoly profits. However, the following paragraph will
illustrate why charging a positive price for the use of a non-rival good can lead to inefficiency. If
individuals are required to pay to use knowledge, but the marginal social cost is zero, knowledge
will be used at a lower-than-optimal level. Therefore, intellectual-property rights work as intended,
to protect an inventor's financial interests and those to follow, but at the same time create another
negative externality by creating market inefficiencies.
To illustrate the costs and benefits behind the incentives of patents, consider this the
market for a new product that can be produced at a constant marginal cost 𝑐 < 𝑝 (figure 1) The
downward sloping demand curve D(p) represents the diminishing willingness of consumers to
pay. A firm with a patent acts as a natural monopoly and as such would charge price 𝑝$ , given
the endowments granted by patents and absence of price discrimination, the firm would sell
quantity 𝑞$ , and receive a profit of p.
Consumers enjoy a surplus of S. Both producers and consumers benefit immediately from the
patented product. When the patent expires, non-originator competitive production will eliminate
profit and increase consumer surplus to p + L. Non-originator firms will be driven to invest in
R&D due to the prospect of earning the profit flow p. If profit exceeds anticipated R&D costs of
innovating new products, firms will pursue this opportunity to invest in R&D (Clancy and
Moschini, p. 5, 2013).

Figure 2 Patents and Monopoly Pricing. Demand and surplus model for patents in a market and
its effects on consumer and firm surplus from Clancy and Moschini (2013).
Figure 2 illustrates the disadvantage of the patent grant. After the development of the new
product, 𝑞$ implies that there are consumers willing to pay for the product beyond the marginal
production cost. L represents the deadweight welfare loss based off the fact that the provision of
the product is below the efficient level 𝑞& . From an ex ante perspective, patents provide the
necessary incentive that stirs innovations that would otherwise not happen, undersupplying
innovations in the market without patents. The incentive to innovate provided by patents should
encourage efficient market allocation of resources. Ex post, the monopolistic market established
by patents implies an inefficient production of the product. For the innovators that follow the
originator, the patent may not provide enough incentive because only a small percentage of the
realized benefits can be earned. For example, innovation costs could exceed projected profits
anticipated by a patentee monopolist, but it is lower than the total surplus, consumer surplus and
producer surplus combined (Clancy and Moschini, p.210, 2013).
Sokolov-Mladenović, Cvetanović, and Mladenović (2016) find that an increase in the share
of R&D expenditure in GDP, the independent variable, by 1 percent will have an impact on the
growth of real GDP, the dependent variable, by 2.27 percent. This model considers the financial
crises and the negative fertility rate in the EU28 on economic growth (Sokolov-Mladenović,

Cvetanović, and Mladenović, p. 13, 2016). My model will differ in terms of specification, it will
a non-linear model as opposed to a linear model.

IV.

Methodology

The population regression model is as follows:
𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐷𝑒𝑥𝑝-. = 𝛼- + 𝛽4 + 𝛽5 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝-. + 𝛽: 𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙-. + 𝛽= 𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑜𝑤-. + 𝛽@ 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝐺𝑜𝑣𝐸𝑥𝑝-.
+ 𝜀-.
The 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝-. and 𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙-. independent variables will be interchanged with
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑-. and 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚-. , 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒-. respectively. This means we will have
six regressions in total.
I have constructed the model as a double-log functional form. This is done because we
can reduce the absolute size of the number associated with same actual meaning. Later this will
be important in setting my expectations for the variables. This makes it easier to work out
impacts in percentage terms. For example, R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP may move
up or down in percentage points, but the number of patents granted is measured in the hundreds
of thousands, making it practically impossible to determine the impact of patents on R&D
expenditure without a logarithmic function. All independent variables but government subsidies
will be log functions.

Dependent Variable: Research and Development expenditure as a percentage of
GDP (𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐷𝑒𝑥𝑝-. )
The source for the R&D expenditure dependent variable data comes from the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The organization defined

R&D as a percentage of total expenditure on R&D carried out by domestic companies, research
institutes, universities, and government laboratories in a country, encompassing a wide range of
R&D outlets. However, the OECD excludes domestic spending for R&D expenditures on outside
the domestic economy.
Although R&D expenditure is a quantitative figure and easily implementable for the
purposes of my paper, it is worthwhile to note that not all technical developments are fully
measurable from R&D. According the OSLO manual, the OECD guidelines for collecting an
interpretation innovation data, R&D has two main limitations. First R&D is an input; it does not
measure the output of technical change. Second R&D does not encompass the combined efforts
of firms and governments in technical change. Other non-R&D expenditure inputs leads to the
prevalence of non-R&D input measurements. Examples include development of human skills,
through internal training and "learning by doing". (OECD, pg. 36, 1990). The dependent variable
𝑅𝐷𝑒𝑥𝑝- accounts for the research and development expenditure as a percentage of GDP in the
US and EU.

Number of patent applications (𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝-. )
Data regarding the number of patent applications is sourced from the World Bank. The
number of patent application is assumed to be applications made by residents of the domestic
economy. I chose to use a broad, macro measurement of patents since the scope of this paper
covers the entire economies of two countries. There are more specific measurements of patents
such as the "quality of patented invention" which can be measured by the scope of patents
(Squicciarini, Denrnis and Criscuolo p. 10, 2013). While this adds more depth to the
measurement of patents than a simple count of the number of applications for patents, it requires

a very technical framework that is beyond my current ability. For the intent of this paper, I am
not focusing on the dynamic effects that patents have on related and unrelated industries as that
would go beyond my scope of interest. This variable is meant to generalize the relationship
between R&D and patents, allowing room for depth in future papers. The main drawback of
patents as innovation indicators are that many innovations are not patented, multiple patents
cover some, some may not be worth any value while others have very high value (OECD, pg. 22,
1990)
Although I focus on the relationship between patents and R&D expenditure, I will
include other independent variables to determine if they affect the relationship between the
patent variables and R&D expenditure dependent variable.

Number of patent applications granted 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡-. )
Like the reasoning behind my first independent variable. This variable considers patents
that have been approved by the respective patent office and are circulating the patent litigation
system. This variable will be separately regressed by replacing the 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝-. variable. The
independent variable 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑-. accounts for the number of patents granted at the
US or EU’s respective patent offices.

Firm size 𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙-. , 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚-. , 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒-.
Schumpeter (1942) argues that the degree of innovation is positively correlated with
protection and market power. A large firm needs costly short-run legal protection which would
provide adequate short-run market power to incentivize R&D expenditure. Without protection,
Schumpeter believed that large firms would not be as likely to invest in R&D and there would be

no technological advancement. In economic terms, Schumpeter stated that only large firms have
the capabilities to induce technological change while small firms were incapable of meaningful
R&D expenditure. According to Schumpeter, small firms are incapable efficiently allocate
resources for R&D in such a competitive environment.
Although Schumpeter makes a rational argument, there is a lack of empirical evidence
supporting Schumpeter’s hypothesis. In a mature capitalist economy, relatively large firms create
large shares of technological advancement to society. While large firms’ contributions are
important, evidence from the past two decades of technological growth suggest that smaller firms
play a significant role as well. The 1990s boom of technology reveal that small firm sizes may
not be an obstacle to obtaining a share of the market value of innovation. Before the 2000s,
public R&D expenditure was larger than private R&D in the 2000s, business had the largest
share of R&D expenditure. Meanwhile, R&D expenditure in business were increasing in small
companies. That is not to say large businesses haven’t conducted R&D in the past, only that
small companies are intensifying their share of R&D in technology market place (Liu, 2011, p.
36).
For this paper’s purpose, firm size will encompass both small and large firms unlike other
papers that do not include both simultaneously, which this paper intends to collect data on more
than one class of firm size. The data collection in this paper should hopefully bear some findings
to the lack of empirical evidence relating firm size and R&D expenditure despite that
Schumpeter’s theory is widely supported by various economists. I classify the distribution of
firms in each economy based on the number of employees, ranging from small, medium, and
large.

Due to preliminary findings of imperfect multicollinearity (Table 6) between the firm size
variables when they’re all included in the population regression, the firms size variables will be
put into individual separate regression, in addition to the individual patent regressions. This
means there will be six separate regressions.

Government Subsidies as percentage of total government expenditure (𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝐺𝑜𝑣𝐸𝑥𝑝-. )
Because technical knowledge can be considered a good, it can also suffer from market
failure which can provide a rationale for government intervention to correct such market failures.
Becker (2013) notes that R&D exhibits a classical public goods problem as it is both not
completely excludable and it is a non-rival good. If the rate of private return of the R&D
investment is below the social norm, which is likely if firms are unable to fully capture the
returns from their R&D investment, then private returns may be lower than what is socially
optimal. If firms are limited to their degree of commitment of financial resources to R&D,
especially by smaller and younger firms, then R&D expenditure may again be lower than
optimal. The typical financial solution would be to subsidize the economic activity required to
spur positive externalities from R&D investments. Usually there are two policy tools available to
governments which are R&D tax credits and direct subsidies of private R&D investments. The
first approach is a free-market oriented approach, leaving the decision making and timing of
investments up to the market. The second approach of government support of private R&D is
possible through government-funded research in universities and public research centers
(Becker, 2013, p. 22).
This variable may be troublesome due to implication of the ‘relabeling’ problem.
Companies always aim to be cost-efficient, meaning R&D expenditures may be overestimated

on monthly financial statements as a response to increase tax credit. Firms then have an incentive
to maximize R&D as a percentage of total costs to qualify for tax credit. This would imply that
tax credits have a positive correlation with R&D expenditure.
González (2008) finds that government support for R&D is more effective in small firms
and firms which operate in low-technology sectors. It was found that the impact of subsidies on
private effort becomes positive and significant. On average, subsidized firms were found to
perform a private R&D effort 0.35 percentage points higher than non-subsidized firms
(González, 2008, pg. 15). I account for government subsidization as a percentage of government
expenditure with the variable 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝐺𝑜𝑣𝐸𝑥𝑝-. .

Historical financial performance (𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑜𝑤-. )
Because innovation, a factor that Schumpeter stresses heavily as an important factor of
economic development, requires a potential plethora of research and development investment, it
is only natural that one must consider that the implementation and finance of undertaking such
costly investments. The financial arrangements matter in R&D spending due to the expected
risks and returns of an R&D investment in each financial circumstance. Boot and Thakor (1997)
suggest that high technology firms give more weight to stock market price and reaction feedback
because of R&D spending. Booth, Junttila, Kallunki, Rahiala and Sahlström (2006) investigated
the impact of R&D activities on market value of stocks in 20 countries. The find support for that
nation that the stock markets consider firms' R&D expenditure as value-increasing activity rather
than simple cost. In particular, their findings show that as equity financing intensifies,
represented by the stock market, relative to bank loan financing, the stronger the R&D
expenditure link (Booth, Junttila, Kallunki, Rahiala and Sahlström, p.14, 2006). For my paper's

purposes, we will use the performance of the Dow Jones Industrial Average as a general
indicator of equity levels of financing. The Dow Jones Industrial average accurately reflects
global economic changes, meaning it will reflect the ongoing economic events in both the United
States and European Union. I account for stock market performance using the variable 𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑜𝑤-. .

Dataset and Sources
Patent application data was acquired from the United States Patent and Trademark Office
through the statistical database Data-Planet, patents from the European Union was acquired from
Eurostat, the primary database for statistics regarding the EU. Research and development
expenditure as a percentage of GDP was gathered from the OECD database. Subsidies as a
percentage of government expenditure was collected from the World Bank. Firm size
distribution data was gathered from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and Eurostat. Acquired
firm size distribution data on the European Union was more difficult than expected, databases
were not as well organized and did not have complete datasets compared to the BLS's database.
Dow Jones Industrial data was easily accessible from Google Finance. The US has noticeable
differences to the EU in almost all regards to the dependent and independent variables. R&D
expenditure is consistently above that of the EU, although both countries' R&D expenditure are
steadily rising. The number of patent applications is significantly higher in the U.S. compared to
the EU, the same can be said for the number of patent application granted.

V.

Final Econometric Model

Figure 3 Double-log functions. The shapes that the double-log functional form can take. The left
shows an isoquant while the right shows various shapes if 𝑋: is held constant or is not included
in the equation (Studenmund, p. 195, 2016).

Initially the population regression model was going to be considered as a linear model
due to an initial negative expectation between patents and R&D expenditure. The relationship,
however, may be tied to the constant elasticities over slopes since patents are exponentially
increasing while R&D expenditure oscillates (Boldrin and Levine, p.1, 2012). While it is
possible for patents to have a positive effect on R&D expenditure, it may be that this positive
effect is increasing at a decreasing rate. A double-log model can capture this plateau effect unlike
a linear model which has constant slopes.
Since we are using a double-log regression model, the nature of the expectations will
depend on whether the independent variable’s correlation is bigger than one, between one and
zero, or less than zero.

l𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝-. and 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡-. are expected to be between zero and one with R&D
expenditure as the increasing number of patents in the market generates deadweight loss and
inefficiency (Clancy and Moschini, 2013). In addition, referring to Figure 1, potentially higher
innovation costs may stunt R&D investments. 𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙-. and 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚-. are expected to be
negative based on the Schumpeterian belief that relatively small firms are more likely to be
inefficient at managing R&D expenditures while 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒-. is expected to be larger than one
based on the opposite expectation that large firms contribute significantly to R&D expenditure
(Liu, 2011, p. 36). 𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑜𝑤-. is expected to positively influence R&D expenditure, given that
sturdy financial performance across multiple industries is likely to positively correlate with R&D
expenditure a value above one is expected. 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝐺𝑜𝑣𝐸𝑥𝑝-. is expected to be above one since
R&D subsidization helps stimulate additional R&D expenditure (González, 2008).
A panel data will be used to accommodate the cases of the U.S. and EU over two time
periods. Panel data models will allow for more degrees of freedom and more variability in
sampling than a cross-section. The null hypothesis states that there is no statistically significant
relationship between patents and research and development expenditure while the alternate
hypothesis rejects the null hypothesis:
𝐻4 : 𝑝 > .05
𝐻X : 𝑝 < .05

Picking the fixed effect or the random effect model
Based on the population regression model we select between the fixed effect model and
random effect model. Based on the p-value:
𝐻4 : 𝑝 > .05 → 𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑘 𝐹𝐸
𝐻X : 𝑝 < .05 → 𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝐸
For 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝-. /𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙-. and 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑-. /𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙-. we reject the
null hypothesis and pick the fixed effects model. For 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝-. /𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚-. ,
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝-. /𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒-. , 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑-. /𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚-.
al𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑-. /𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒-. we fail to reject the null hypothesis so the random effects
model is selected. By selecting the random effects model, will have more degrees of freedom
than a fixed effects model, since are only estimating the parameters that describe the distribution
of the intercepts rather than estimating intercepts for every cross-sectional unit. We end up with
NT-1 degrees of freedom for the random effects model and NT – N– 1 for the fixed effects
model. However, the main disadvantage is that the impact of omitted variables is assumed to be,
in this case our firm size variables because of multicollinearity, is uncorrelated with the
independent variables (Table 13). We also have a transformed model assuming it applies to all
six regression models:
𝑅𝐷𝑒𝑥𝑝-. = 𝛽4 + 𝛽5 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝-. + 𝛽: 𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙-. + 𝛽= 𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑜𝑤-. + 𝛽@ 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝐺𝑜𝑣𝐸𝑥𝑝-. + (𝜀-.
+ 𝛼- )
Multicollinearity
The classical assumption for multicollinearity is that we assume no perfect or imperfect
multicollinearity. There is no assumed relationship among the independent variables.

Using STATA’s vif function, we search for a VIF value above five for imperfect
multicollinearity. Focusing on the sample regressions’ patent and firm size variables
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝-. /𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙-. , 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑-. / 𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙-. , and
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑-. /𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚-. had values under five. However,
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝-. /𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚-. and 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑-. /𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒-. had values over five,
indicating imperfect multicollinearity. 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝐺𝑜𝑣𝐸𝑥𝑝-. and 𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑜𝑤-. under all regressions had
VIF values under five. When the patent variables 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑-. and
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝-. were combined as one regression, regardless of which firm size variable was
present individually or all together, there was extremely high multicollinearity. Likewise, when
all firm size variables were included, regardless of which patent variable was present
individually or altogether, there was extremely high multicollinearity (Table 3)

Heteroscedasticity
The classical assumption for heteroscedasticity is that we assume the 𝜀-. variable is
homoscedastic or 𝑉 𝜀-. = σ: . This states that the observation of the error term drawn from a
distribution has a constant variance. Since panel data is simply a repeated cross-sectional model,
heteroskedasticity is more likely to take place than in a time-series.
Using STATA’s hettest function, we look for a p-value that is .05 or smaller to reject the
null hypothesis and to confirm there is significant evidence of heteroscedasticity. All six
regressions have p-values higher than .05. Therefore, we fail to reject the null-hypothesis and we
have homoscedasticity in the regression. The reasoning could be due to the oscillating nature of
R&D expenditure as mentioned by Boldrin and Levine (2012).

VI.

Discussion of results

Patent variables
In all firm sizes, 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠-. and 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑-. was between one and
zero meeting my expectations. In all cases the p-value was statistically significant at one percent.
The patent variables, although all values were between one and zero, were increasing in
magnitude as the firm size variable went from 𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙-. , 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚-. and 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒-. . This
implies that patents could be correlated to firm size, possibly increasing in correlation as firm
size increases. The correlation for 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑-. and firm size, although it followed
the same pattern as 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠-. , was not of the same magnitude. It seems that
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠-. , which involves the number of potential patents or patent applications, has a
stronger effect on R&D expenditure. This could be likely due to the relationship between ex ante
and ex post rent expectations that firms have when entering the market. An ex ante perspective
could be correlated to the number of patent applications. In a perfect market, all information is
freely available, which may true for currently existing patents. However, information regarding
patent applications is not as widely available as the actual patent themselves. Firms would likely
proceed with their R&D investment whether a rival has a similar patent in the process of
application. Had a previous similar patent existed prior, R&D investment is likely to be
decreased in magnitude due to the firm knowing about the potentially lost rents.
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑-. can be seen from an ex post perspective where established patents
potentially reduce the incentive to invest in R&D because now, after the fact, only a small
percentage of the original profits can be earned (Clancy and Moschini, p.210, 2013). This partly
answers my research questions. Since all patent coefficients have a value between one and zero
we can assume patents are having an increasing effect on R&D expenditure at a decreasing rate

implying a plateau effect on R&D expenditure. Although it is tempting to imply from this result
that such a value implies that the costs of patents are outgrowing the output of R&D expenditure,
I would require more in-depth patent variables that measure the length and quality of patents
rather than just the number of patent applications and actual patents circulating the market.
Patents do have a correlation, a statistically significant one (Table 1 and Table 2), however the
magnitude of R&D expenditure depends on whether the patent application is still an application
and not an actual patent. While Clancy and Moschini have identified potential market
inefficiencies caused by patents (Figure 2), this paper places their economic theory in the context
of decreasing total factor productivity using R&D expenditure as a quantitative measure. In
terms of policy, on the macro side, do we limit information regarding patent applications to spur
innovation, or on the micro side, do we allow for the free flow of information to allocate capital
in the most efficient manner possible.

Firm size variable
It was expected that the size of a small firm would severely limit its ability to make
significant contributions to its R&D investments. Although small firms had an unexpected
coefficient between one and zero, implying a positive correlation with R&D expenditure at a
decreasing rate. It is hard to say why this might be the case as Schumpeter (1942) only
generalizes the fact that small firms cannot make significant contributions to R&D investments.
However, this problem does open the need to include alternate innovation measurement
indicators other than purely quantitative R&D expenditure. Qualitative measurements suggested
by Sveikauskas (1986) such as managerial and organizational quality, integration of industrial
relations system could help answer this unexpected coefficient, however it is again difficult to

quantify such factors. According to the OECD (2005) OSLO manual, small and medium firms
have ways that produce innovation through non-R&D outputs. Examples include ‘learning by
doing’. Medium firm size fell within expectations, although more robust coefficients could be
achieved by implementing the qualitative factors in regressions. Perhaps the most unexpected
firm size coefficient was the large firm size variable as I was expecting a coefficient greater than
one but received a negative value under both patent variables. Previously, I had trouble
collecting data on the distribution of firm sizes from the European Union because it only
included data from 2005 to 2014 whereas the U. S’s BLS provided data on the distribution of
large firms from a much wider time span. The negative coefficient in a double-log function
would imply a negative correlation at a decreasing rate. Under both patent variables, the large
firm size variable was statistically significant at the one percent level. However, under the patent
application variable, the large firm coefficient was significantly more negative than under the
patent applications granted variable. The unexpected sign in the large firm variable could be
partially explained by the unexpected sign in the small firm variable. At the turn of the century,
firms of any size, small and medium included, could cross over most barriers to entry that its
historical twentieth century counterparts wouldn’t be able to do. For example, the internet
became an information super highway that anyone with a connection could access which greatly
lowered the barrier of information. Schumpeter’s (1942) negative view of small firms on R&D
investment stems from the capabilities of small firms at that time. Now small firms can compete
with larger competitors using the internet (e.g. online retailing versus brick and mortar
businesses).

Subsidization
The coefficient for subsidization did not fall under expectations. Where a value greater
than one was expected, under all patent variables, the coefficients were between zero and one.
The order from largest to smallest coefficient, under patent applications, was seen in the medium
firm size variables, then small firm size, and then largest firms size. The coefficient value implies
that the effect subsidization on R&D expenditure has a positive correlation albeit at a decreasing
rate. Becker (2013) notes that firms alter their statements to acquire tax credits in the form of
R&D tax credits from the public sector. This may explain why subsidization was the smallest
value at the large firm size end of the spectrum. Larger firms have more to gain from tax breaks
if they hold back on publicizing actual R&D expenditures, whether the R&D investment has
been recorded or not. The results imply that subsidization has a stronger correlation to R&D
expenditure at the small firm level. The reasoning behind the significance of small firms in
relation to R&D expenditure and subsidization is beyond the scope of this paper’s current
literature, however it highlights the issue of measuring the effects of subsidization on R&D
expenditure while incorporating firm size variables. In addition, the separation of firm sizes into
separate regression was done to reduce imperfect multicollinearity, however by doing so I
potentially created omitted-variable bias. It is possible that the model is trying to compensate for
the separated firm size variables by overestimating or underestimating the effect of one of the
other variables.
The unexpected coefficient results applied to the number of patents granted variables as
well, in the same order of magnitude with subsidization having the largest effect on R&D
expenditure under the medium size variable, followed by the small firm size variable, and finally
having a negative correlation under the large firm size variable. It seems that the effect of

subsidization on R&D expenditures does not differ in terms of positives and negatives, but it
follows the similar pattern from the firm size variable discussion in that subsidization has a
greater impact on R&D expenditure under the number of patent applications variable compared
to the number of patents granted variable. Although the literature states there is a ‘relabeling’
problem in firms overestimated R&D expenditures to benefit from R&D tax credits, it is difficult
to find a logical explanation as to why subsidization seems to have a greater effect in magnitude
than under the number of patents granted variable. However, future research on the relationship
between patents and R&D expenditure under the context of R&D tax credits could bring
understanding as to why tax credits may positively or negatively impact, assuming a linear
relationship, R&D expenditure depending upon firm size. Policy implications could include
taking firm sizes into account for ‘relabeling’ where applications for R&D tax credits are
concerned.

Historical financial performance
The historical performance of the financial environment, measured by 𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑜𝑤-. , was
expected to have a coefficient greater than one. However, under all patent variables, the
coefficient was between zero to one. Similarly, to the subsidization and firm size variables, the
financial environment variable had a stronger effect on R&D expenditure than under the patents
granted variable. Under both patent variables, historical financial performance, under the small
firm variable, had the largest impact on R&D expenditure, followed by the variable under
medium firm size, and lastly the variable under large firm size which had the smallest impact on
R&D expenditure. Since all values were between one and zero in all cases, it implies that past
performance of stock markets had a positive effect on R&D expenditure albeit at a decreasing

rate. It seems to be a recurring theme that for the variables that were expecting to have
coefficients greater than one, had coefficients between one and zero. This means that there is a
positive relationship between these variables and R&D expenditure, however eventually they
reach an inflection point. Booth, Junttila, Kallunki, Rahiala and Sahlström (2006) only assumes a
linear relationship between R&D expenditure and growth of equity, whereas my paper is
specifying a non-linear double-log form. It may be more beneficial to specify historical financial
performance as how well each year compared to the previous year rather than just the raw value
indicator.

VII.

Conclusions:

Initially, the research question began with the curiosity as to what might have been
causing total factor productivity in the U.S. to decline over the past decade. I used R&D
expenditure as a percentage of GDP as a quantitative measurement of innovation. The value of
the coefficient of the patent variables indicated a diminishing returns effect. Based on the
coefficients from Table 1 and Table 2, patents are generating diminishing marginal increases to
R&D expenditure despite exponentially increasing in number. Regarding policies, although
patents are exponentially increasing in number with only gaining diminishing marginal returns, it
would be hasty to say that patents are detrimental to R&D expenditure as they form a crucial part
of providing financial incentives for would-be innovators. On the other hand, we could be
wasting potential total factor productivity gains by continuing the exponential patent trend. An
optimal patent policy would be a reform that involves preserving the idea of a patent while
lessening the penalties of infringement. Policies can include an improvement to improving the
quality of patents to avoid another Amazon “one-click purchase” patent, or re-evaluate the

litigation stance towards patent trolls to prevent out of date firms from interfering with
innovative firms.
This paper gives a potential framework for the application of patents at the macroeconomic
level. However, the scope of this paper does not cover the microeconomic level. A natural
extension of this macro-based paper would be to analyze effect of industry-specific patents on
overall industry R&D expenditure, while also taking patent length, quality, and alternate
innovation measurement outlined by the OECD’s OSLO manual. Clark (2016) noted that 80
percent of U.S. R&D expenditure is heavily concentrated amongst a couple of industries that
only make for 20 percent of total U.S factor productivity growth. U.S. R&D expenditure is
heavily concentrated around manufacturing which contributes a small portion to U.S. total factor
productivity, while the service sector has a small share R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP
but makes up an overwhelming majority of U.S. total factor productivity. By looking at the effect
that patents could have on the industry level, I could acquire a more precise relationship between
patents and R&D expenditure.

List of tables
Table 1: Sample estimates with the number of patent application variable
VARIABLES
lnPatentApp
lnSmall
SubsGovExp
lnDow

(1)
lnPatentApps/lnSmall

(2)
lnPatentApps/lnMedium

(3)
lnPatentApps/lnLarge

0.170***
(0.0544)
-0.0S17
(0.0912)
0.012
(0.0231)
0.578***
(0.0919)

0.384***
(0.0762)

0.653***
(0.0970)

0.018
(0.0193)
0.487***
(0.0827)
-0.708***
(0.215)

0.002
(0.0107)
0.252***
(0.0771)

lnMedium
lnLarge
Constant
𝑅:
Observations

18.52***
(1.620)

25.08***
(2.039)

0.677
0.752
40
39
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

-0.439***
(0.0727)
21.07***
(0.812)
0.900
31

Table 2: Sample estimates the number of patent application granted variable
(1)
lnPatentAppsGranted/lnSmall

VARIABLES
lnPatentAppsGranted
lnSmall
SubsGovExp
lnDow

(2)
lnPatentAppsGranted/lnMedium

0.187***
(0.0579)
0.00122
(0.0848)
0.00501
(0.0230)
0.626***
(0.0924)

0.350***
(0.0758)

18.20***
(1.584)
0.682

22.08***
(1.731)
0.733

40

39

0.00895
(0.0198)
0.620***
(0.0830)
-0.467**
(0.185)

lnMedium
Constant
𝑅:
Observations

(3)
lnPatentAppsGranted/lnLarge

VARIABLES
lnPatentAppsGranted
lnLarge
SubsGovExp
lnDow
Constant
𝑅:
Observations

0.490***
(0.179)
-0.275**
(0.117)
-0.0191
(0.0161)
0.476***
(0.0967)
20.87***
(1.190)
0.789
31

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3: Robustness check for multicollinearity
VIF
Model

(1)

(2)

Variable

𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝-. /𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙-. 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝-. /𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚-.

𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝-.

2.58

6.42

𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑-.
𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙-.

2.62

𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚-.

6.61

𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒-.
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝐺𝑜𝑣𝐸𝑥𝑝-.

1.07

1.27

𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑜𝑤-.

1.06

1.20

VIF
Model
Variable
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝-.

(3)
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝-.
/𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒-.
26.70

(4)
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑-. /𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙-.

𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑-.

2.28

𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙-.

2.30

𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚-.
𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒-.

29.38

𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝐺𝑜𝑣𝐸𝑥𝑝-.

1.07

1.08

𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑜𝑤-.

1.06

1.08

VIF
Model
Variable

(5)

(6)

𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑-. /𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚-. 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑-. /𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒-.

𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝-.
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑-. 4.37

33.07

𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙-.
𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚-.

4.58

𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒-.

35.88

𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝐺𝑜𝑣𝐸𝑥𝑝-.

1.23

1.09

𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑜𝑤-.

1.13

2.13

VIF
Model
Variable
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝-.

(7)
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝-. /𝑙𝑛S𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙-. /
𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚-. /𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒-.
37.69

𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑-.

(8)
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑-. /
𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙-. /𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚-. /𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒-.
48.69

𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙-.

113.22

95.57

𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚-.

48.40

53.71

𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒-.

85.99

133.80

𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝐺𝑜𝑣𝐸𝑥𝑝-.

1.03

1.16

𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑜𝑤-.

3.77

3.30

VIF
Model
Variable

(9)
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝-.- /
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡e𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑-. /𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙-. /
𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚-. /𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒-.

𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝-.
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑-. 109.72
𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙-.

114.81

𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚-.

53.97

𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒-.

139.78

𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝐺𝑜𝑣𝐸𝑥𝑝-.

1.52

𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑜𝑤-.

3.89

Table 13: Hausman test
Variable

Chi-squared P-value

𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝-. /𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙-.

10.75

0.029

𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝-. /𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚-.

4.97

0.290

𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝-. /𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒-.

3.19

0.367

𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑-. /𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙-.

12.58

0.001

𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑-. /𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚-. 0.92

0.921

𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑-. /𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒-.

0.977

0.45

Table 14: Heteroscedasticity test
Variable

Chi-squared P-value

𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝-. /𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙-.

0.32

0.057

𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝-. /𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚-.

1.04

0.306

𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝-. /𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒-.

0.89

0.345

𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑-. /𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙-.

0.11

0.742

𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑-. /𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚-. 0.32

0.572

𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑-. /𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒-.

0.548

0.36
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